Globalization and Governance:

A New Role for Non-Governmental Organizations?

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【Abstract】

Globalization is often defined in terms of the new era of rapid development of the multinational corporation. Additionally, political globalization is often conceptualized as a playing field not limited to a discrete unit (such as a nation-state) but rather open to complex, multi-level actors, above and within a particular state. There is a growing body of scholarship addressing the affects of globalization on local governance and state sovereignty. Only recently have researchers begun to examine the third sector of society to better understand the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in today's global society. Clearly changes have been profound, raising a number of question for policy-makers as they address issues concerning social welfare responsibilities, global poverty, and development. This paper begins by employing the social origins model to explain the changes in NGO development, method of operation, and role in governance brought about by globalization.

Finally, the paper concludes by presenting possible future trends in NGO development and suggesting constructive roles for policy actors. Throughout the paper focuses on the environmental subsector and environmental NGOs in both China and the U.S. as an illustrative example.

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> *The truth is that government and the nonprofit sector have entered into a Faustian bargain, and either (or both) may lose its soul in the process.*
>
> H. Brinton Milward(1996, 88)

Even though volunteers and the spirit of volunteerism have around for centuries, it has only been during the past one or two decades that volunteers' role in society has emerged as a field of study. Often voluntary organizations are said to form the third sector, in contrast to government and business, which make up the first two sectors. This third sector, also often referred to as civil society, is comprised of not-for-profit or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which carry out a variety of functions and activities. Furthermore, in the most recent years, scholars have come to realize that the third sector is not unique to the United States; NGOs can be found in every country, in every corner of the globe.

As the third sector plays an increasingly important role in the delivery of public services thought traditionally the responsibility of the state, various issues facing both the theory and practice of public administration need to be examined, and hopefully resolved. As Milward, Provan and Else(1993) states, both the effects of state funding on nonprofit organizations and the insulation form citizen control that such arrangements create need normative and empirical attention (322). They define hollowness ad the degree to which government agencies are separated from their outputs, and suggest that we "construct a model that relates the characteristics of 'hollowness' to a set of dependent variables (efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, accountability and equity) that are used to judge governmental performance" (322).

Many of these issues are most salient for today's public administrators who manage the interactions between the sectors, and will continue to be as we head into the new millennium and more and more governmental responsibilities are devolved to third parties. In fact, even twenty years ago

Musolf (1980) and others were concerned about the meaning of accountability for organizations half in, half out of the public sector: "Suspicion exists that the nonprofits are likely to be vehicles for private entrepreneurs who are pursuing, if not a partisan or private interest, at least a highly personal vision of the public good" (124). Indeed, the accountability issue seems paramount, and Estelle James (1989) presents a nice summary of such concerns as how the government holds NGOs accountable, what strings are attached to public funds, do governmental regulations alter the nature of third sector service delivery, and do public funds cause voluntary organizations to lose their autonomous nature and become mere extensions of the state.

Jeffrey Brudney (199), in his examination of government agency reliance on volunteers, stresses that such involvement makes public organizations dependent on their citizen participants for both quality and responsiveness of government services. Volunteers may even play a role in defining the goals of public organizations (75-89). According to Sullivan (1987), by turning production of public services over to private groups, governments can effectively waive constitutional restraints, creating a serious threat to constitutional rights and democracy. Donald Kettl (1988) is concerned about the implications for theory as the involvement of the third sector upsets traditional and hierarchy, as well as neutral competence (25-26). Finally, Lipsky and Smith (1989-90) maintain that nonprofit service organizations weigh equity and responsiveness differently from government as they focus on serving those clients compatible with the nonprofit's mission (632).

With all of these overwhelming concerns, there must be some justification for government-third sector partnerships. Of course in this day of constricted governmental agency resources and a growing distrust of bureaucracy, the voluntary sector has stepped into a void. But are there other, more positive reasons for the involvement of nonprofits? Anheier and Seibel identify six justifications for the state to delegate some of its responsibilities: 1) to create a buffer to protect some services from political influence; 2) to escape from some known weakness; 3) to put the activity where the real talent exists; 4) to spread power according to participation theory; 5) to provide government with delivery structures not found internally; and 6) to extend activities without adding employees (144). Brian O'Connell (1996) suggests that the largest contribution the sector has to offer is the independence they provide for innovation, advocacy, criticism, and where necessary, reform. He is quick

to add, additionally, that "Efforts by all Americans, including the President and Congress, should be devoted to building upon that uniqueness without exaggerating what the sector can do or what government should not do" (225).

Recent scholarship has found it difficult to discuss the new roles and growth of NGOs without addressing globalization effects. Of course much attention has been given to economic globalization and governance at the international, national, regional, and local levels, and this globalization has greatly affected relationships among the sectors. However, it is also important speak in terms of "political globalization," which Cerny (1997, 253) defines as politics being increasing shaped not within insulated units (such as a particular state) but rather by complex multi-level actors, acting in multi-layered networks, above and across as well as within state bounds. Such political globalization has catalyzed rapid third sector growth, and has cause an evolution of state-NGO relationships.

This paper analyzes an interesting and under-reported manifestation of political globalization: the new, emerging role of the nonprofit or non-governmental organization in governance at all levels. I begin by first defining the third sector, which is in itself no simple task. Next I will launch into a discussion of the various concepts which attempt to describe the development of NGOs and their relationship with the state in various countries. Next I will present some of the challenges of a "globalized third sector," on governance, offering advice for policy makers. Finally, I will apply these concepts to a specific third "subsector" in a specific country: environmental NGOs in China.

Ⅰ. The Third Sector Defined

In order to compare the third or civil society sector in various counties, we must be certain that the unit of analysis is the same regardless of the location or nation. This is easily accomplished by defining the elements that comprise the third sector according to five specific criteria. First of all, organizations must be organized and institutional to some degree, perhaps signified by a legal charter or other method. Second, these entities must be institutionally separate from government, although they may receive significant government support. Third, they must not return profits generated to their owners or

directors; they must be self-governing. And finally, elements of the third sector must involve some meaningful degree of volunteerism, since it is the embodiment of this principle that forms the core of civil society (Salamon and Anheier 1997a, 61).

It is one thing to define nonprofit or nongovernmental organizations, but it is quite another to operationalize the definition to create variables so that the third sector can be compared cross-nationally. Two key variables defining a country's nonprofit sector are the scale of its operations and its sources of support. Scale can be measured by examining such things as employment, operating expenditures, and volunteers and volunteer time. Sources of financial support for nonprofits include donated or contributed income, the public sector, and the sale of services or products. When these variables are applied to various third sectors around the world, it is easy to demonstrate the great variation in both sources of funding and scale (Salamon and Anheier 1997b).

Ⅱ. The Social Origins Theory of Third Sector Development

Central to the social origins theory is the notion that complex phenomena like the emergence of the welfare state or democracy or even the third sector cannot be easily understood by examining a single factor, such as industrialization or social entrepreneurs. Rather these phenomena are heavily constrained by prior patterns of historical, cultural, and social development. According to Esping-Anderson (1990, 31,32), there are three distinct welfare regimes: 1) the "liberal" welfare state common in Anglo-Saxon countries and characterized by limited assistance with strict entitlement rules; 2) the "corporatist" welfare state more common on the continent of Europe in which the state supplies welfare assistance but preserves many of the status differences of pre-modern society; and 3) the "social democratic" welfare states of the Nordic counties characterized by universalism and a separation of welfare provision from the market system. Salamon and Anheier were able to adapt there ideas to create a model of third sector regime as shown in Table 1.

<Table 1> Model of Third Sector Regime*

Government Social Welfare Spending	Nonprofit Scale	
	Low	High
High	Social Democratic	Corporatist
Low	Statist	Liberal

* From Salamon and Anheier, 1996b.

This table differentiates the regimes according to two dimensions: the scale of the nonprofit sector and the extent of government social welfare spending. The liberal regime, upon which much of the nonprofit theory has been framed, consists of low government social welfare spending associated with a large non profit sector. It features a significant ideological and political hostility to an extension of government social welfare protections and a decided preference for voluntary approaches. At the opposite extreme is the social democratic regime, characterized by high government spending and low nonprofit involvement in welfare service delivery (but not in other activities, such as social or even recreational interests). This regime most likely exists where the working class is able to exert effective political power to coerce the government into fulfilling its needs. In the corporatist regime the government has been either forced or induced to partner with the third sector in service delivery, leading to a rather surprising increase in the civil society sector with a corresponding increase in government social welfare protection and nonprofit activity. Such a regime occurs when government exercises power on its own behalf, or for business and economic elite, but with a degree of autonomy sustained by long traditions of deference and a pliant citizenry.

Salamon and Anheier (1996b) were able to collect data for eight countries (U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Hungary, and Japan) and apply it to critically analyze the results of this exercise. However, the empirical data gathered give considerable support to this approach. All four of the regime types were reflected by the countries examined (Hungary was omitted because recent political and economical upheaval defied classification) as demonstrated in Table 2. Importantly, the nonprofit sector is treated not as an isolated phenomenon but rather as an integral part of a social system whose role and scale is a byproduct of a complex set of historical forces. Distinct patterns are evident that can be analyzed and compared; certain circumstances are more

congenial to the blossoming of nonprofit institutions than others, and the resulting shape and character of the third sector is affected by the social forces that give rise to it.

<Table 2> Test of Social Origins Model of Nonprofit Sector*

Government Social Welfare Spending	Nonprofit Scale	
	Low	High
High	*Social Democratic* Sweden Hungary	*Corporatist* Germany France
Low	*Statist* Japan	*Liberal* U.S. U.K.

*From Salamon and Anheier, 1996b.

Such a theory is a tremendous aid for public administration, both for research and practice. The social origins theory illuminates why and to what extent a third sector develops within a given country. However, this approach does little to provide insight for the public administrationist concerned with the interactions between his or her agency and a nonprofit organization. Indeed, not only does it fail to describe relationships at this "micro" level, it also falls short in describing the "macro" level, where the state and the third sectors interact as entities. Perhaps a model describing such relationships can provide enlightenment.

Ⅲ. Toward a Model of Interaction

There are important levels of interaction between NGOs and government, and several scholars attempt to describe these in terms of linkages. The first possibility, *autonomy*, describes the situation in which the government has effectively no interaction with the third sector and no control over NGO resources. *Low* linkage refers to only moderate interaction between the sectors. *Moderate* describes some but no regular interaction. *High* linkage occurs when there is much interaction, but the NGOs are able to maintain some control over the flow of resources to and from themselves. Finally, the situation where government controls heavy interaction with the NGOs is referred to as

direction (Esman and Uphoff 1984, 153)

These different levels are easily understood in terms of a linear model based upon the power relationship between government and the third sector (Coston 1998, 362-64). The left of the scale represents asymmetrical power, described by a governmental power advantage. The right end of the scale describes a sharing of power between the two sectors. This model does not go as far as to describe a power centered in the nonprofit sector, as this is rarely the case. (It seems that this is possible in some developing countries, in which the third sector receives considerable funding from foreign government and other international donors, and where the government is looked upon unfavorably both internally and externally.) At some point along the spectrum resistance to institutional pluralism gives way to acceptance, that is the government accepts NGOs as legitimate actors in society. The eight types of government-NGO relationships, from complete asymmetry to symmetry, are repression, rivalry, competition, contracting, third party, cooperation, complementary, and collaboration (Coston 1998, 364-75).

In both the cases of repression and rivalry, there are unfavorable government policies toward NGOs. These can be formal through laws that forbid voluntary organizations and some services, or through policies that mandate reporting and operating procedures that can inhibit efficient NGO operations. More informal government polices may include a refusal to provide services beneficial to NGO development, or a mandate that there services be provided sluggishly. The NGO response may be to sway local opinion away from compliance with government policy in general. Such is the case with the "second society" of informal and unregistered Islamic associations in Egypt (Salamon and Anheier 1996a, 107). In any case, repression is simply an extreme case of rivalry.

Competition between government and NGOs can be viewed both economically and politically. Economically, they may compete for external funding (from foreign sources) or for community contributions to service provision. Politically, NGOs may be view as unwanted critics of government as well as usurpers of government power. Some governments fear that autonomous organizations will challenge their political control or provide political bases for subversion, Competition can yield positive results, especially when there is a greater responsiveness to local needs, and greater accountability. However, such competition may complicate greater cooperation which will benefit not only

both sectors, but also citizens.

Contracting is the first relationship category under an institutional pluralistic umbrella. In this case, the state remains the essential actor while operation activities are devolved to other organizations. Very often a difference between service provision and service production is described; the government is responsible for provision, even if other organizations are producing the services. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) offer a nice analogy: the distinction between steering and rowing a boat.

Third-party government is closely related to contracting. In this relationship, government shares a substantial degree of its discretion over the spending of public funds as well as the implementation of public policy with NGOs. Salamon (1989) and others have described a set of tools available to government including not only contracts, but also loans, loan guarantees, and insurance. These tools still transfer service production to third parties, but at the same time allow for citizens to choose their own service provider, resulting in less federal influence over any one NGO. Many international donor agencies actively promote third-party government (USAID 1995) and other countries, such as the US, have arrived there through decentralization and downsizing.

A cooperative relationship between government and the third sector involves information sharing, resource sharing, and joint action. This occurs when there is a free flow of information between the two sectors, each informing the other of its respective operations where deemed necessary; NGOs follow government's rules; and government policy is positive, or at the very least neutral, toward the NGO sector. Thus, there is an unconstrained coexistence of the two sectors' operations (Kramer 1981).

The underlying essence of both complementary and collaboration is an emphasis on comparative advantage, or mutual resulting benefits for both sectors. The distinction between this type of relationship and one of cooperation is the recognition of a more specialized role for NGOs, as opposed to a supplementary or competitive one. Generally speaking, NGOs' service delivery advantages are combined with governments advantages in resource generation and democratic priority setting. Often, the bottom-up action by NGOs can be seen as complementary to the top-down action of government. The distinction between collaboration and complementary is that a collaborative relationship is much more formal; the informal nature of complementary may restrict the relationship to particular service and

geographical areas, or to certain NGOs.

Complicating the vocabulary, collaboration is often referred to as coproduction. This is not production set against provision, as the relationship involves government's sharing of responsibility and operation with other actors, including private enterprise and NGOs. It entails NGO participation in planning and, at a minimum, consideration of NGO input in policy making. It should be noted that authentic collaboration between the sectors is difficult, if not impossible to obtain. Several scholars have gone as far as to say that NGOs at best will be considered junior partners (Kramer 1981) or that collaboration exists in name only (Salamon 1987).

The advantage of this spectrum of descriptive relationship is that it allows both the scholar and practitioner to scan a given environment to classify the government-NGO interactions. However, this model relies on only one dimension: degree of institutional pluralism as a function of the power relationship. Obviously, this can be difficult to operationalize and quantify. What is needed is a working model which relies upon the previously defined variables of sector scale of operations and sources of support.

Ⅳ. A Concept of Sector-State Relationships

The scale of operations is a good indicator of the strength of the third sector: the greater the scale, the stronger the sector. Likewise, the interest of the state in the third sector can be revealed by examining third sector sources of support; government interest and value leads to financial support. It is also necessary to add a less easily quantified variable describing the regulatory nature of the state over the third sector. The specific ways in which sector-state relationship play out depends on the strength and structure of the sector as well as the nature and interest of government. In general, three generic types of relationships can be identified: the non-interventionist model, the regulatory model, and the mediated or balanced model.

In the case of the non-interventionist model, the states is relatively laissez-faire regarding the third sector, neither regulating extensively nor supporting directly. This can produce two scenarios, depending upon the strength of the third sector. First, in the case of a weak or underdeveloped voluntary sector, the result will be relative isolation between the state and NGOs, with the

third sector performing well below its potential. On the other hand, if the third sector is quite strong, non-intervention by the state may produce an autonomous voluntary sector, with or without accountability to the public depending on the capacity and willingness of the sector to be self-regulating. Among developed countries, Australia and New Zealand provide perhaps the best examples of comparatively non-interventionist national government and relatively strong sector, producing considerable autonomy (Philips 1999, 5).

Although virtually every country has some form of regulation of the voluntary sector, the regulatory model is defined by the predominance of regulation and regulatory institutions in structuring the relationship between the state and the voluntary sector. This implies a state keenly interested in shaping a particular kind of relationship in which concerns over accountability are paramount. Perhaps a good example of this model in practice is the United States. The relationship between the government and the third sector here is shaped largely through the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Not only does the IRS set and enforce detailed regulations for financial management and public disclosure of information, but it shapes the conduct of management practice more broadly in very specific detail (Williams 1998a, Williams 1998b). Regulation by the IRS is reinforced by other legislation, such as a Taxpayer's Bill of Rights, by self-regulation, and by extensive regulation at the state level, particularly in relation to fundraising activities (for example, see State of Georgia Code Sections 43-17-9 and 48-8-3). Thus the effect of the regulatory institution is not only to ensure accountability, but to provide assistance to organizations and to promote transparency. Even though the growing nature of state regulation is seen by some to be excessive (Salamon and Anheier 1997b, 364-5), the relationship in the United States has considerable support from the sector itself and does not necessarily imply government dominance ("Charity" 1999).

The third model classification, mediated or balanced, describes a relationship among relatively equal parties. It thus requires a state mindful of the important role of the voluntary sector and a strong and well-organized third sector. Government both regulates and supports the sector, recognizing a large degree of autonomy for the sector while providing considerable transparency for the public. Shared understanding and mechanisms for dialogue between the sectors provide a connection and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. The balanced model is best exemplified in England where the Charity Commission, a

government department without a minister, supervises, educates and advises voluntary organizations (Ware 1989).

V. An Integrated Framework

The social origins theory, the model of interaction, and the concept of state-sector relationship outlined above can be combined to provide a valuable tool to both scholars and practitioners. This integrated framework can be displayed graphically to demonstrate the inherent nature of these sectors in society (Figure 1). The framework is laid out along two axis: government involvement (measure in terms of scale). The four quadrants are defined in terms of social origin (social democratic, corporatist, statist, and liberal) as well as state-sector relationship (regulatory, mediated or balanced, non-interventionist isolated and non-interventionist autonomous). The descriptions of interaction can be seen as points located within quadrants. It is important to point out that these points are located in Figure 1 for descriptive purposes only; in reality, these interactions are by no means discrete points, but can vary within a quadrant (or even move across an axis to another quadrant) according to the actual situation found in a given geographical or service area. Also, whether or not a particular type of interaction is located in the southern or northern hemisphere has more to do with where the interaction between the government and the third sector is formal or informal than anything else. As mentioned previously, repression and rivalry may be either formal or informal. The progression from competition to contracting to third party, as well as the one from cooperation to complementary to collaboration, is one of increasing formality.

Most importantly, it is important to recognize that this framework does not do justice to the complexity of the origins and relationships and the third sector. However, this can serve as a heuristic for a comparative study of the voluntary sector in various countries.

Figure 1. A Framework for Government-Third Sector Relationships

High Government Involvement

Ⅵ. Political Globalization and the Third Sector

The past twenty-five years have seen a tremendous growth in the third sector so that now the combined total of NGOs in the advanced economies and the developing countries is at least in the tens of thousands. The advanced economies, plus the multilateral organizations, plus NGOs themselves, have accounted for between $60 billion and $65 billion in aid to developing countries annually for the past decade. The largest number of internationally oriented NGOS among the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations come from the United States. In 1996, there were 417 U.S. NGOs registered with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as organizations engaged in overseas relief and development. And such growth is not limited to development, the grow in numbers of indigenous NGOs has been dramatic (Dichter 1999, 39-40).

But why this tremendous growth and globalization of NGOs around the globe? The reasons are as diverse as the third sector itself (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Stimuli to NGO Sector Growth and Globalization

The Retreat of the State

The growth of the multinational corporation in the 1960s has been well documented. A more subtle parallel growth which began about a decade later was the development of a global nonprofit sector. This rather slow growth was accelerated in the 1980s and 90s, as the role and size of the state were reduced. There are many reasons for this, including less social spending and privatization of many government services. In the U.S., for example, "Reagonomics" dictated that tax cuts for the wealthy and large corporations will have a "trickle-down" effect, thereby compensating for a decrease in social-welfare programs. Many nations around the world needed stabilization and structural adjustment programs to stave off economic collapse. These states then cut back domestic programs to reduce fiscal deficits. Very often the third sector stepped into the void left by the state (Lindenberg 1999, 151-52).

Persistent Poverty and Armed Conflict

The past several decades have witnessed persistent poverty on a global scale. Indeed, structural adjustment programs of supranational organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the International Monetary Fund, and others have appeared to improve the lot of a select few, while increasingly marginalizing the majority of people in developing countries (Pillay 1998, 11-13). Global and local NGOs have began to address issues of persistent poverty; it remains to be seen if the third sector will gave greater success than the state or the international organizations.

At the same time, the 1990s and the new millennium have witnessed continued natural and manmade disasters and conflicts. Very often only relief and aid nongovernmental organizations are allowed by the controlling authorities to help affected citizens. The current Middle East crisis is perhaps the best example. This new mandate for global NGOs, by the way, has created an increasingly dangerous work environment for aid workers and volunteers.

Collapse of the Soviet Union.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union had far-reaching effects on the globalization of the third sector. First of all, the regional balance of the developing world was upset. Nations, such as Cuba, who had come to rely on the Cold War support of the Soviets suddenly found themselves without economic and political backing. Although western donor nations were willing to give aid to some of the affected countries, this simply resulted in a shift of support away from traditional "front line" client states (Lindenberg 1999, 152). Additionally, the 1990s ushered in a growth in the number of people, in the hundreds of millions, living under new or re-established democratic regimes. The resulting expanded civil liberties and personal freedoms allowed for increased space for civil society development, and NGOs once again stepped into this new arena.

The power of Technology

Without a doubt, one of the greatest contributors to expanded growth and globalization rates of the third sector has been technology. Suddenly, NGO volunteers and staffers found themselves just an e-mail message, fax, or telephone call away from their own members as well as supporting structures and networks. Technology has enhanced collaboration between OECD and indigenous nongovernmental organizations. It has decreased average response times and increased efficiency and management of operations. The Internet has proved a great source for information, and nonprofits have begun to effectively employ it as a dynamic tool for gathering information, for recruiting, and for organizing. Just as importantly, technology has been effectively utilized in advocacy and fundraising efforts (Rodgers 2001).

A New Volunteer Ethic

As noted previously, the past decades have seen a tremendous growth in the number of volunteers. Governments have begun to rely on volunteers more and more to provide many of the services traditionally thought to belong to the government sector. Additionally, following somewhat of a backlash to materialism so prevalent in western cultures in the 1980s and 90s, many individuals and groups have turned to volunteerism as way of achieving a certain satisfaction. Indeed private giving has reached all time records as people respond to humanitarian emergencies in such places as Somalia,

Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Middle East. The September 11 tragedies in the U.S. have resulted in donations of almost $600 million to the American Red Cross (www.redcross.org). Global NGOs have also worked hard to promote a new ideology of volunteerism as a response to global problems.

Institutions of Higher Learning: Not Just Ivory Towers

Although colleges, universities and institutions of higher education have not been traditionally considered nongovernmental organizations in the strictest sense, one could argue that they are third sector entities. They contribute to the growth and development of citizens and provide an atmosphere for activism, service, and engagement. In the U.S., innovative university presidents have begun to speak in terms of the "global university" (see, for example, University of Georgia President Michael Adams' State of the University Address, 2001 and 2002). As universities think about competing successfully in today's global society, administrators and faculty members are beginning to provide international opportunities for students. U.S universities have very strong public service and outreach mission, and are beginning to launch applied research, technical assistance, and training projects abroad. In a recent survey, Devereux and Durning (2001) found that a full 70% of U.S. schools of public policy and management are engaged in international activities.

Ⅶ. The Effects of Globalization on Government-Third Sector Relationships

Table 1 and Figure 1 present the Social Origins theory of NGO development and NGO-state relationships, respectively. This is an excellent starting point, but only partly explains real-world interactions. The single most important effect of globalization on the third sector around the world is that it has added a new layer of governance networking. Returning to Cerny's conceptualization of political globalization, a whole new cadre of actors have been added to the playing field. Again, the governance within a state is subject to players within, without and across. Just as the global corporations and the international governing bodies(United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank) affect decision-making at the national, regional, and local levels, so too do global NGOs

affect governance.

In addition to the model of state-NGO interaction reflected in Figure 1, there are also NGO-NGO interaction structures. Very often these are based on the relationships among NGOs in the developed economies and those in the developing countries. Although there is no well-developed typology for such interactions, Lindenberg and Dobel (1999, 17-18) map several emerging structures, including confederations, federations, bumble bee and loose networks and alliances (Figure 3).

It is one thing to simply state that globalization is changing governance at the NGO-state interface, and quite another to list the challenges of such evolution. In 1999, the senior leadership of ten global developed economy relief and development NGOs organized a conference to, among other things, identify the challenges presented by the changing global environment. Although this is the "other side of the coin," from policy maker perspectives, so to speak, I maintain they are the same concerns shared by government officials, and ate building blocks for positive state-third sector collaboration. the challenges identified by the group are (as adopted from Lindenberg and Dobel 1999, 7-8):

1. The intrastate conflicts created by the end of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the weakness of many new states have resulted in major new global refuge flows, which overwhelm global institutional response capacity.

Figure 3. Hypothetical Map of Emerging NGO Structures in Global Space(Lindenberg and Dobel 1999, 18)

2. Increasing distrust of the state, new faith in the global free market, and the pressures of global competition have stimulated severe public sector cut backs, which weaken the capacity of the state.
3. Although economic globalization has resulted in the creation of new wealth and employment in many parts of the world, it is accompanied by impoverishment and new forms of poverty elsewhere.
4. Global institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and United Nations are poorly equipped to deal with new dimensions of global poverty, massive refugee flows, and intrastate conflicts.

5. The rapid increase in NGOs results in competition among themselves for resources. It also creates major dilemmas in how to cooperate with state and corporate sectors in gaining resources.
6. All NGOs face new pressures for greater accountability for program impact and quality.
7. Many NGO staff express a sense of malaise and burnout about their ability to make a difference in society. Increasing professionalization and bureaucratization as they grow to address global problems contribute to this worry about ability to sustain commitment and mission.

Strong advice for government policy-maker is the same internal responses fashioned by the leadership of the ten global NGOs(Lindenberg and Dobel 1999,9):

1. Reexamine values.
2. Create a new vision and mission.
3. Redesign new strategic directions and programs.
4. Transform organizational culture and create learning organizations.
5. Build global networks and organizations.
6. Increase accountability, transparency and efficiency.

Government leaders everywhere, at all levels of government, much engage both the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors in addressing both global and local problems. Referring to Figure 1, state-NGO involvement must move to the right-hand sectors, in which interaction is characterized as cooperative, complementary and collaborative.

Ⅷ. The Environment Third Subsector in China

As mentioned previously, Salamon and Anheier tested the social origins model by gathering data concerning all types of nonprofit organizations. I will attempt here, however, to examine not only their model but the integrated framework in terms of the environmental subsector. This subsector is important because a deepening crisis of the environment has stimulated a rise in nonprofit organizations around the world. I will attempt here, however, to examine not only their model but the integrated framework in terms of the environmental subsector. This subsector is important because a deepening crisis of the environment has stimulated a rise in nonprofit organizations around the world. Despite some improvements, the overall environmental picture at the global level has continued to deteriorate, in some respects at an alarming rate. This is do not only to population growth and continued poverty in developing nations, but also because of wasteful practices of the more developed nations (Salamon 1995, 258). In a survey of seven countries (U.S., France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Japan), Salamon and Anheier (1996a) have found that 1% of NGO expenditures are in the environmental field, equaling that of international and civic/advocacy activities, and more than philanthropic organizations (0.4%). Additionally, I have chosen to analyze the Chinese case. Here the authoritarian communist regime is unique in its political-economic system; however, for the first time in fifty years of communist rule, the government recognizes the need for nongovernmental actions (Ma 1998, 332).

Defining the social origins regime in China presents a dilemma. Does such an approach apply for an authoritarian, communist nation, even one gradually embracing a free market? Chinese propaganda concerning volunteerism began to appear in the late 1980s:

> In China, the tumultuous 10-years (1996-76) "cultural revolution" undermined good social morals and customs and people became indifferent in their personal relationships. Today, the decadent bourgeois idea that money is everything contends with the communist ideology that one should live to better the lives of others. The emergence of a volunteer service in the past three years has shown that the communist morality is gradually taking root. ("Volunteer" 1983, 24)

Obviously this is quite a different motivation for volunteerism than found in other nations. However, on December 5, 1994, the China Youth Volunteers' Association (CYVA), or China's "peace corps," was founded in Beijing. Since that time, some 72.4 million youths have donated 3.1 billion hours of service, and CYVA is believed to be the world's largest group of volunteers ("China's" 1998, 8-9). Its primary goals of providing social services and improving the qualities of Chinese youth parallel many of those found in voluntary organizations in the West. (Its third goal, to help establish and perfect the system of a socialist market economy, is probably quite unique to China.) And in 1994, according to rough estimates, there were 100,000 voluntary organizations across China ("Volunteers" 1994, 5). (It is important to note the "squishiness" of such estimates; indeed, comparative research in th field of volunteerism is difficult due to varying definitions of "volunteer.")

Many of these organizations are involved with environmental programs. For example, CYVA volunteers in various cities are working in scenic areas and historical spots, urban greenbelts and street gardens. Many of the young people are engaged in various environmental activities such as protection, education, and awareness training, as well as tree-plating. An interesting recent development has the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) developing a mechanism to encourage the public to participate in environmental protection activities. Wang Yuqing, Vice-Director of SEPA, has stated that the devotion of many volunteers and non-governmental organizations to environmental protection shows the public has a strong sense of responsibility towards the country and society as a whole. SEPA is considering annual appraisals of such efforts, as well as a public supervision system to evaluate the government's environmental efforts. Currently there are about 2,000 environmental NGOs across China, including over 200 at the national level (Yinglang 1999).

Obviously China has incredibly high levels of government social welfare spending, characteristic of a communist state. The recent proliferation of NGOs in the country has been allowed by the state, or more exactly, enabled by official government laws and regulations. There are certain subsectors where non-governmental activity is forbidden, such as human rights (Riker 1995, 202). When a regime is characterized by an expanding government provision of social welfare and a constrained nonprofit sector, such as we see

here, it is called social democratic.

Here the regulatory nature of the government-sector relationship also supports the social democratic regime. Recognizing that the organizations of the Chinese state itself are often inefficient and insufficient to meet the social (and environmental) needs of the people, officials and entire units of government have allowed or prompted business firms and NGOs to appear as a way to address widely felt shortcomings. Any autonomy gained by the voluntary organizations does not indicate confrontation or conflict with the government, but more to perform services more effectively. In fact, for Chinese citizens the state and society are two sides of an integrated entity that is harmonizing and mutually dependent (Ma 1998, 321). This of course echoes of stronger collaborative interactions in the future.

Most environmental NGOs focus on environmental education and community development work, rarely criticizing central government policy. Some of the nonprofits have begun to build partnerships with local governments, which enable the NGOs to assist local officials in implementing environmental policies. In fact, an examination of the environmental protection field shows that a wide range of organizations, with varying degrees of autonomy, have found space in which to operate. "Moreover, the close relationship between NGOs and the government can be seen as beneficial at this state of China's development" (Knup 1997, 11). This subsector has also recently globalized, and now nearly 40 U.S.-based NGOs operate environmental or energy projects in China, including the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, the Mountain Institute, the World Wildlife Fund, and The Nature Conservancy (Beach 2001). Additionally, Chinese NGOs rarely find sources of financial support locally, as there are few domestic foundations and private donors. Overseas foundations have begun to support the environmental subsector, and this support has become a major catalyst for further NGO development (Jin 2001, 8).

A quick scan of Figure 1 demonstrates that state-NGO relationships in China should be governed by repression and rivalry. One could argue that the environmental NGOs are indeed repressed in China. For example there are regulations which stipulate that if there already exists a professional organization or a similar social organization dealing with a certain issue, one cannot establish a group focusing on that issue. Additionally, social organizations are required to formally register with a government agency in

order to become an independent an legal social organization, actually identifying a government "mother-in-law" sponsor. For these and other reasons, Chinese nonprofits are often categorized as GONGOs (government organized NGOs) (Jin 2001, 5).

However, it is not easy to classify state-environmental NGO relationships as rivalrous. The NGOs and governments tend to work together, for many of the reasons previously discussed. However, the third sector is still developing and is far from autonomous; the state is very much involved in the organization and operation of nonprofits. The near future will witness continued government control, but as China converts to a free market (such as through WTO membership), government officials will need to recognize globalization of the third sector. NGOs are carving out a new, collaborative role in service delivery throughout the world, and China is no exception.

Ⅸ. Summary and Recommendations

The relationships between the state and the third sector are far more complex than this work gives credence, However, the framework does serve as a nice heuristic that offers some insight. My goal is to provide a tool for practitioners and scholars in understanding the interactions between government and NGOs, and to lay the foundations for future endeavors.

It is important to note that this is only an initial examination of the effect of globalization on state-sector interactions. I recommend that large N studies apply this framework by gathering empirical data for the environment and other subsectors in China and other countries. Additionally, more in-depth case studies using the framework in discrete nations, geographical regions or service sectors will offer valuable insight. Only then will we realize the true value of this government-third sector relationship framework in today's globalized world, and begin to overlay the dependant variables so important in public administration and governmental performance: efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, accountability and equity.

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