

Governors' Powers

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I. Introduction

No other single actor plays as significant a role in the American state policy process as does a governor. Governors are seen as the most powerful political figures in most states. The state's legislature, bureaucracy, press, politics, and public policies are highly influenced by or bear the imprint of the governor (Beyle, 1996).

Governors are supposed to have a lot of roles in the state. A handbook written just for governors lists the following: the head of the executive branch, legislative leader, the head of the party, national figure, family member, and ceremonial chief (National Governors Association, 1978). As the central political figure in the state government, the governor plays a great role in

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establishing the state's legislative agenda through such actions as preparation of the executive budget and the state-of-the-state address. The governor also actively participates in the legislature's deliberations on both budgetary matters and state policy initiatives. Moreover, state executive departments expect the governor to establish administrative goals and implementation strategies, and state residents look to the governor for political leadership and guidance (Dilger, 1995).

Whether gubernatorial powers need to be strengthened has been an important controversial issue in American politics. Strong gubernatorial power has been an accepted tenet of reformers for many years. Reformers criticize that term limitations, the long ballot, earmarked funds, inadequate appointive powers, as well as other factors have operated to "shackle" the governor. They have recommended, thereby, extending gubernatorial terms, permitting reelection, increasing appointive authority, and providing governors with staff support(Thompson, 1995; Herbert & Brudney, 1988). In contrast, others (e.g., Elling 1994; Gove, 1964; Harris, 1959) point out that governors as chief executives have already won enough positional powers in many jurisdictions and that factors such as personality, skill, and situation loom much larger in the success of the chief executives than their formal authority.

There are many important questions to be considered before discussing whether "stronger" governors are needed. Most of all, we need to examine the current status of the gubernatorial powers exactly. Despite many existing studies, indeed, it is still open to question whether and how governors influence public policies in America (Barrileaux & Berkman, 2003). This strongly indicates that we need to develop a comprehensive and refined index of gubernatorial powers. Without this, undoubtedly, an attempt to make American governors strong will lose its course. The refined index of gubernatorial powers may provide a frame of reference for comparing the governors in terms of their powers, thereby leading to a better understanding of the differences in governors' powers.

In an effort to develop a comprehensive index of gubernatorial powers, this

study addressed the following questions. First of all, what factors contribute to governors' powers? What variables constrain governors' powers? Second, how can we structure a refined governors' power index? Are there other new indicators that contribute to providing a general profile of gubernatorial powers? Third, to what extent do governors' powers vary across the American states? How can one say that this governor is more powerful than any other governor? Finally, what are important implications of the index for governors in Korea? How can we construct an index of governors' powers in Korea?

To answer these daunting questions, this study focuses on three separate sets of variables associated with gubernatorial power resources: institutional powers, personal powers, and enabling powers. Integrating the three power resources into a single index, this study proposed a more comprehensive and refined index of gubernatorial powers and drew its important implications for governors' powers in Korea. In Korea, indeed, developing a refined index of governors' powers helps enlighten how much clout governors have in their provinces.

II. Gubernatorial Powers in American History

Governors have not always been at the top of the order in their states, nor have they always been at the center of most state activities (Beyle, 1996). The distrust that the American colonists had toward their governors, who represented the king, was reflected in their design of the structure of the state governments. When the original thirteen colonies made their own state constitutions, they wanted a powerless, ceremonial officer rather than powerful gubernatorial leader. Indeed, the negligible powers and responsibilities given to the earliest governors reflected the basic antipathy of the colonial citizens toward executive power (Beyle, 1996).

Under the typical constitutional design for the original states, indeed,

governors had little formal authority. Selected by their own state legislatures to serve a one-year term, the first generation of governors had no veto power. Moreover, all gubernatorial appointments required the approval of an executive or governor's council.

In 1816, Thomas Jefferson called for the revision of Virginia's constitution, and argued that the states needed to reform their constitutions periodically. Since then, many states followed Jefferson's call and Virginia's actions, thereby increasing governors' responsibilities and independence from the legislative body. The selection of governors moved from the legislature to the public with terms of two or four years. During the century, periodic constitutional reforms have transformed the office of the governor from a nominal into that of a state CEO. Many of the early restrictions placed on governors were removed or greatly reduced.

In the twentieth century, constitutional revisions and executive branch reorganizations have changed state governments and clarified lines of authority (Beyle, 1996). By the 1950s, constitutional reform movements had created stronger chief executives in the states. These movements were re-enforced by the new federalism and the increasing complexity of running state governments in the 1980s. Governors now have longer terms of office and more staff for assistance. In addition, they have been given considerable budget authority to help control the executive branch, and more veto power to use in their legislative negotiations (Beyle, 1996).

III. Constructing the Power Index: Dimensions of Gubernatorial Powers

Identifying and defining gubernatorial powers is a very daunting task. The index of gubernatorial power is meant to capture resources a governor can bring to bear in order to facilitate his or her ability to govern effectively (Holbrook, 1993). Excepting only a small number of governors' aggregate

power indexes, it is difficult to find a comprehensive and refined index. Further, there is little in the literature to assist in either the selection or description of measures to be included in governors' informal power index. As the result of difficulties in conceptualizing and measuring informal powers, researchers have focused on the formal powers available to governors more frequently than the informal. Comparative systematic research on gubernatorial power often uses measures of power with Schlesinger's Index (Schlesinger, 1965) of Gubernatorial Power as the most common measure. It has been updated, amended, and criticized, but still widely used. In public administration, for instance, the Index of Gubernatorial Power has been used in studies of public policy (Dye, 1969; Fry & Winters, 1970) and gubernatorial influence over the bureaucracy (Sigelman & Dometrius, 1988; Dometrius, 1979). Often, it has also been the subject of analysis itself (Mueller, 1985, 1987; Dometrius, 1979, 1987).

In an effort to update Schlesinger's index, Beyle (1996, 1990) attempted to classify the gubernatorial powers into two dimensions: personal power and institutional power. As shown in Table 1, the personal power includes electoral mandate, position on the state's political ambition ladder, personal future of governors as governors, personal style of governors, and gubernatorial performance ratings. The institutional power index included separately elected state-level officials, tenure potential, the power of appointment, control over budget, veto power, and party control.

(Table 1) The Powers of the Governors: Beyle's Index

Personal powers	Institutional powers
Electoral mandate	Separately elected state-level officials
Position on the state's political ambition ladder	Tenure potential
Personal future of governors as governors	The power of appointment
Personal style of governors	Control over budget
Gubernatorial performance ratings	Veto power
	Party control

Although there has been some heated debate regarding the validity of Schlesinger's and Beyle's indexes of gubernatorial powers, the measures do provide a basic framework of analysis essential in comparing governors' institutional resources (Wright, 1967; Beyle, 1968, 1988, 1995, 1996; Dometrius, 1979, 1987; Bernick, 1979; Sigelman & Smith, 1981; Mueller, 1985; Sigelman & Dometrius, 1988). Moreover, they have provided a framework to measure dynamic changes in the extent of governors' institutional powers over time.

Similarly, Holbrook (1993) identified six indicators of gubernatorial power. They were focused on institutional powers including appointive power, veto power, staff resources, organizational power, tenure potential, control over the budget. According to his analysis, the strongest governorship was found in Alaska and the weakest governorship was found in South Carolina.

On the other hand, the National Governors' Association (1987) identified three types of gubernatorial resources available when governors interact with others in state government: personal, institutional, and enabling (Bowman & Kearney, 1986). Personal resources are the governors' intellectual, political, and verbal skills, including charm, charisma, and sense of humor; they represent the ability to persuade others to take actions that the governor believes are necessary. Institutional resources refer to the governor's legal authority (derived from the state's constitution or its statutes); they represent the ability to force others to take actions that the governor believes must be taken. Finally, enabling resources include staff assistance, access to information, and time. These represent the governor's ability to process information in order to reach decisions without dependence on other competing organizations such as interest groups and the state legislature (Dilger, 1995). Along the same line, Beyle's latest version (1996) employs measures of two sets of gubernatorial powers including personal power and institutional power.

(Table 2) Importance of Governors' Influence Instruments as Perceived by Agency Heads

Instrument	Importance score
Budget authority	3.55
Interest in agency	3.17
Appointment power	3.08
Staff's skill	2.81
Management skill	2.78
Legislative skill	2.78
Removal power	2.55
General veto	2.47
Reelection prospect	2.22
Electoral mandate	2.20
Item veto	2.19

Source: Herbert & Brudney (1988)

Note: The importance scores were calculated by taking the mean of a four point scale, assigning the values of one to four to the responses "none," "slight," "moderate," and "high" in importance.

As shown in Table 2, the American State Administrators Project (ASAP) survey report (1978) offers an important clue in developing indicators of gubernatorial influences. It allows the development of agency-level indicators of gubernatorial influences. More importantly, unlike most previous studies of the governorship in which the degree of power was inferred from certain statutory features of state government (such as the veto power), this study assesses the influence of the governor through the perceptions of the directors of state agencies (Herbert & Brudney, 1988). This report indicated that various kinds of measures of governors' power can newly be included in the index such as management skill, interest in agency, and legislative skill.

This study attempts to develop a comprehensive index of gubernatorial powers. For this, the indicators of gubernatorial power in this study are in part based on NGA's research (1987) as described above. The NGA's categorization of powers provided a useful framework in considering executive powers as relational-contingent. In addition, other some useful indicators are borrowed from Beyle's works (1995, 1996). Based on the literature, the index

developed in this study is designed to integrate and measure various dimensions of gubernatorial powers together as depicted in Figure 1. The index of gubernatorial power was constructed utilizing three dimensions to measure the extent of each of these dimensions. As presented in Table 3, gubernatorial powers are conceptualized in this study in three ways: 1)institutional power that includes executive branch powers and legislative branch power, 2)enabling resources, and 3)personal power. Each dimension of the powers is discussed in depth in the following sections.

〈Table 3〉 A Comprehensive Index of Gubernatorial Powers

Institutional powers		Enabling powers	Personal powers
Executive branch powers	Legislative branch powers		
Organization authority	Budget making power	Staff support	Electoral mandate
Appointive power	Veto power and Legislative override	Fiscal resources	Position on the state's political ambition ladder
Power of removal	Party control	Composition of state cabinet	Personal style of governors
Tenure potential	Power of calling a special session	Budge document deadlines	Gubernatorial performance rating

Institutional Powers

The institutional powers of the governors are those powers given to governors by the state constitution, state statutes, and the voters when they vote on constitutions and referenda (Beyle, 1996). Beyle (1995) argues that three distinct indicators of how the governors interact with other institutions are the governor's administrative abilities, legislative relations, and media relations. For this study, governors' institutional powers are considered in two dimensions: executive branch powers and legislative branch powers.

Executive Branch Powers

Among the institutional powers, the executive branch powers, in particular, focus on the powers the governors have in their relationship with administrative agencies. The executive branch powers include organization authority, appointive power, the power of removal, and tenure potential.

Organization authority: An important gubernatorial control over the bureaucracy is the power to reorganize or create governmental agencies. The power gives the governor the ability to reorganize parts of state government by executive order (usually subject to legislative review) in an extension of a state's major reorganization effort. Once the new organizational structure is in place, the governor has the ability to make changes as needed rather than being required to wait for another major reorganization (Beyle, 1995). This power can be measured in a scale which divides the power dichotomously like the governor who has the power to organize and the governor who does not have this power.

Appointive power: Most of the literature on gubernatorial personnel powers has focused attention on the power of appointment, the ability to place people of their choosing in policy making and administrating positions (Schlesinger, 1965, 1971; Beyle, 1995, 1996). The power of appointment is fundamental to a governor's administration, especially in relation to the state bureaucracy and extends to the governor's legislative role (Beyle, 1996). Indeed, there is a wide variation in the ability of the chief executive officer to hire and fire his key managers—the cabinet secretaries, department heads, and bureau chiefs who implement his programs and carry out his policies, to say nothing of the line workers who actually deliver the state's services.

Although governor's appointive powers may have increased in many states, governors cannot appoint someone to a position already filled by a public employee with basic constitutional protections (Beyle, 1995). In addition, the power of appointment is constrained by a large number of separately elected executive branch officials over whom the governors have relatively little influence except at budget time.

〈Table 4〉 The Appointive Power of Governors

Score	Category
5.0	Governor appoints: no other approval needed
4.0	Governor appoints: board, council or legislature approves
3.0	Someone else appoints: governor approves or shares appointment
2.0	Someone else appoints: governor and others (legislature) approve
1.0	Someone else appoints: no approval or confirmation needed
0.0	All officials separately elected or selected by legislature

Source: Beyle (1996)

Holbrook (1993) suggests two perspectives that conceptualize governors' appointive power. The first is adapted from Beyle's works (1995, 1996). As presented in Table 4, this measures the degree of control that the governor has over the appointment process in agencies responsible for six major functions of state government: corrections, welfare, health, highways, public utilities regulation, and education. The second appointive power variable is based on the number of other statewide elective offices. This variable can be measured by the count of the number of eight prominent statewide offices that are elected in a state: Lt. Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, Treasurer, Auditor, Controller, Education, and Agriculture (Holbrook, 1993).¹⁾

The power of removal: In contrast to the appointive power, little attention has been paid to the flip side of the governors' appointment power: the power to remove or fire state officials. State government reform literature and reform efforts have focused on the appointive part of the governor's personnel power. Rich (1961) argued that if "the chief executive is to be held accountable, then he must have not only the authority to appoint his principal department but also the power to remove them." The governor's ability to remove or fire someone in the executive branch has been greatly constrained by U.S. Supreme Court

1) Although the second variable is conceptually similar to the other measure of appointive power, the two only overlap in one substantive policy area, education.

decisions over the past two decades. Beyle and Mouw (1989) indicated that removal power can be measured in five categories as shown in Table 5.

(Table 5) Removal Powers of the Governors

Score	Category
Very broad	Power based in constitution with no specifications, or a court case grants broad removal powers to the governor
Reasonably broad	Power based in constitution alone or with statutory elaboration with specifications in only one area
Moderately broad	Power based in constitution with statutory elaboration with specifications in two areas, or based in statute with specifications in only one area
Restricted	Power based in constitution with statutory elaboration with specifications in all three areas, or based in statute with specifications in two areas, or a restrictive court decision
Very restricted	Power based in statutes with specifications in all three areas, or a very restrictive court decision

Source: Beyle & Mouw (1989)

Tenure potential: Holbrook (1993) indicated that an important source of power for both management and reelection is tenure potential. Over much of the 20th century, one goal of reform has been to increase the tenure potential of governors. The net effect of these changes in tenure potential is the reduced number of individuals who actually serve as governors in the states. One argument can be advanced that those having a high possibility of a longer stay in the office are able to carry out their programs (Beyle, 1996). Tenure potential can be measured on a five-point scale as in Beyle's (1983, 1990) studies, which ranges from 2-year terms with no reelection allowed to 4-year terms with no limits on reelection as in Table 6.

〈Table 6〉 The Tenure Potential of Governors

Score	Category
5.0	4-year term, no restraint on reelection
4.5	4-year term, only 3 terms permitted
4.0	4-year term, only 2 terms permitted
3.0	4-year term, no consecutive reelection
2.0	2-year term, no restraint on reelection
1.0	2-year term, only 2 terms permitted

Source: Beyle (1996)

Legislative Branch Powers

The governor's role in the legislative process has received considerable attention by researchers. The governor has the responsibility to shape the role of the governor by proposing legislation, getting behind the program, and enacting it into the law. Beyle (1983) confirms that a governor's relationship with and success in dealing with the legislature often determines the success of his administration. The underlying assumption is that gubernatorial success depends upon gubernatorial powers and the extent to which a governor employs those powers to prevail upon the legislature (Bernick, 1994).

In general, the efforts to increase the power of the governors and to enhance the abilities of the state legislatures may result in severe conflict between two branches. The problem may be intensified when each branch is controlled by a different political party (Beyle, 1995).

Despite such importance, conceptualizing and measuring success, especially in some systematic fashion, in executive-legislative relations is a very challenging task (Gross, 1991). This study suggests four measures of governors' power over the legislative branch: budget making power, veto power and legislative override, power of calling a special session.

Budget making power: Bernick's (1979) survey of state senators from eleven states revealed that the governor's power to formulate the budget was

ranked first among the important powers possessed by governors. In a study of efficacy of governor's formal powers, Dometrius (1979) found that where the formal budget authority of the governor is high, state administrators are more likely to perceive the governor exerting more control over them than does the legislature. Similarly, Abney and Lauth (1983) found that where governors were vigorous in their use of the budget power, the discretion of administrators in spending was reported to be reduced.

The formal budget powers of governors are generally strong, and governors tend to dominate the executive-legislative branch relationship in the budget matters. However, legislatures are not without influence, and the check and balance feature of the separation of powers system means that state budgeting will inevitably be as much about inter-branch politics as it is about the administrative process (Abney & Lauth, 1989). The budget making power can be measured on a five-point scale as suggested in Table 7.

(Table 7) The Budget Making Power of Governors

Score	Category
5.0	Governor has full responsibility: legislature may not increase executive budget
4.0	Governor has full responsibility: legislature can increase by special majority vote or subject to item veto
3.0	Governor has full responsibility: legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
2.0	Governor share responsibility: legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
1.0	Governor share responsibility with other elected official: legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget

Source: Beyle (1996)

Veto power and legislative override: One important power resource of the governors is the ability to veto the proposals of other actors in the political arena. Accordingly, most empirical research on gubernatorial interaction with state legislatures has focused on gubernatorial vetoes and legislative attempts

to override them (Beyle, 1996; Bernick, 1994; Holbrook, 1993; Abney & Lauth, 1989; Morehouse 1981; Wiggins 1980). Currently, the authority of the governor to veto legislation varies significantly across the states. Beyle (1995) examined that gubernatorial veto power has clearly been strengthened incrementally. Alm and Evers (1989) examined that yet the governors do not exercise this authority frivolously.

Governors veto power is significantly related to the legislature's power to override like a flip side of the coin, emphasizing the importance of measuring governors' power in the relational context. Legislative override indicates that governors are unable to sustain vetoes on some parts of the measures they vetoed. Thompson (1995) argues that the veto points and supermajority requirements faced by chief executives often receive inadequate attention in efforts to construct indexes of executive power. Beyle's (1996) index can be used to measure the governors' veto power, which ranges from 0 to 5 as shown in Table 8.

〈Table 8〉 The Veto Power of Governors

Score	Category
5.0	Item veto: three-fifths of legislators elected or two-thirds of legislators present needed to override
4.0	Item veto: majority of legislators elected needed to override
3.0	Item veto: majority of legislators present needed to override
2.0	No item veto: special legislative majority needed to override
1.0	No item veto: only simple legislative majority needed to override
0.0	No veto of any kind

Source: Beyle (1996)

Party control: Another important variable to consider is how political party control of the governorship and each of the houses of the legislature impacts on gubernatorial ability (see Table 9). Wiggins (1980) examined that the tendency for legislatures to override gubernatorial vetoes was more highly associated

with the divided control of state government than with the strength of the governors' formal veto powers. Most empirical study results indicate that the impact of the item veto depends largely upon the political parties of the governor and legislature.²⁾

〈Table 9〉 Governors' Party Control

Score	Category
5.0	Governor's party has substantial majority (75%+) in both houses
4.0	Governor's party has simple majority in both houses, or a simple majority in one house and substantial majority in the other
3.0	Split-party control in the legislature, or a nonpartisan legislature
2.0	Governor's party in simple minority in both houses, or a simple minority in one and a substantial minority in the other
1.0	Governor's party in substantial minority in both houses

Source: Beyle (1996)

That is, whether executive and legislative branches are controlled by the same political party or are controlled by opposite parties has a substantial influence upon the rate of vetoes. Governors of states where the opposition party controls the legislative branch veto a higher proportion of bills than those whose partisan colleagues constitute a majority of legislative. This indicates that the override of gubernatorial veto is more highly associated with the divided party control of state government than with weakness in the formal veto powers of the governor. This suggests that there are some crucial problems in measuring governors' veto power and partisan control separately (for example, Beyle, 1995). Furthermore, this emphasizes the importance of measuring governors' power in the relational context.

2) In contrast, Mayhew (1991) found no significant differences between divided and "undivided" governments.

Power of calling a special session and limiting subject matter: One important indicator that relatively fails to draw much attention in previous research is governors' power to call a special session and to limit subject matter. Governors have the power to call the legislature into special session. A special session serves "as a device to influence legislation" (Ransone, 1982). Sabato (1983) argued that the special session is seen as a powerful political tool that adds luster to the governor. Bernick (1994) examined that there is a significant relationship between party competition and the number of sessions: one-party states held more sessions.

In some states, the power is shared with the legislature and this sharing of power with the legislature has been increased significantly. However, a legislature may find it easier to convince the governor to call a special session rather than initiate the arduous procedure (Bernick, 1994). Maxwell and Crain (1987) found that if legislators want issues covered in the governor's call of a special session, they must agree to support the governor's program.

Another aspect of this gubernatorial power focuses on whether a governor can limit the action of the legislature when it convenes. In some states, the governor can limit the subject of an extra session, while in other states any subject may be addressed once the legislature has convened. In those states where the governor can limit the subject of a special session, the very ability to limit becomes a potential source of political power. However, even where a governor can constrain the legislature, the limit is on the subject not on the specifics of legislation.

〈Table 10〉 Gubernatorial Power to Call Special Sessions and to Limit Subject Matter

Score	Category
4.0	Governor calls session: can limit subject matter
3.0	Governor calls session: no limit on subject matter
2.0	Either governor or legislature calls session: if governor calls, subject matter limited
1.0	Either governor or legislature calls session: legislature may determine subject

Source: Bernick(1994)

Combining these two elements, Bernick (1994) developed an index of the governors' power to call special sessions and to limit subject matter as presented in Table 10. Governors are strongest in states where only they can call the legislature into session and they can limit the subject matter. Conversely, governors are in the weakest position where the legislature is free to call a special session and also to control the subject matter.

Gubernatorial Enabling Resources

Generally, not as much attention as institutional powers has been placed on improving gubernatorial enabling resources (Bowman & Kearney, 1986; Beyle, 1988; Reeves, 1990). Researchers (Dilger, 1995; Bowman & Kearney, 1986) argue that governors have enabling resources including staff assistance, access to information, and time. These represent the governor's ability to process information in order to make decisions without dependence on other competing organizations, such as interest groups and the state legislature. Despite the importance, Dilger (1995) argued that no such indexes currently exist to help scholars measure and track historical changes in gubernatorial enabling resources.

Indeed, there is little in the literature to assist in either selecting or describing measures to be included in the enabling powers index excepting Dilger's work. Drawing heavily on Dilger's study (1995), this study constructed an index of gubernatorial enabling resources utilizing four indicators: the number of gubernatorial staff per state government employee, the amount of gubernatorial fiscal support per state government employee, and the governor's control over the composition of the state cabinet system were used to measure the extent of the governor's access to and control over informational assistance. Finally, the deadline for the submittal of the state budget document was used to measure the time pressures governors face as they put together their most important legislative document.

Gubernatorial staff support: One potential source of gubernatorial power that has been neglected in the previous studies is gubernatorial staff size. Bowman and Kearney (1986) argued that a competent and sufficiently large clerical and professional staff is vital for the provision of information and advice and for ensuring that such information is processed in a timely manner.

Governors can increase contact with state administrators through use of his staff. When the limitation on the governor's time curtails personal contact with agencies, staff personnel may represent the governor in efforts to exercise influence. Acting indirectly through their staffs, governors have an important opportunity to make known their views of agency programs and to seek changes in agency policies (Dilger, 1995).

The need for gubernatorial staff varies with the size of state government and is not uniform across the nation. To account for this variation in need for staff, the states can be rated according to the proportion of gubernatorial staff to state government employees. Specifically, gubernatorial staff support can be measured by gubernatorial staff total divided by total number of state government employees. For compatibility with other measures, it can be transformed into a five-point scale ranging from very weak (1) to very strong(5).

Gubernatorial fiscal resources: The governor's fiscal resources provide a comprehensive assessment of the governor's ability to build an institutional framework(Dilger, 1995). More specifically, the fiscal resources provided to the governor's office and to the various boards and commissions that report to the governor affect the governor's ability to receive, process, and act on information. As Beyle(1988) argued, these ancillary offices constitute an important and growing enabling resource for the governors.

The states can ranked according to the total fiscal resources provided the governor. However, like staff support, to account for the variation in the need for fiscal resources, the states can be rated according to the fiscal resources provided per state government employee. That is, it can be measured by the total amount of fiscal resources provided divided by the total number of state

government employees. Then states are rated on a five-point scale ranging from very weak (1) to very strong (5).

Composition of state cabinet: The indicator of gubernatorial power to appoint state cabinet members is designed to help account for the governor's access to information and advice from public officials who are not members of the governor's personal staff. Although there has been relatively little research concerning the relationship between governors and their cabinets, larger and more complex state government operations make us consider the need for the cabinet as a critical source of gubernatorial information and advice concerning state administration (Dilger, 1995). As presented in Table 11, the governors' power to select the state cabinet members can be measured on a five-point scale ranging from very weak (all elected independently) to very strong (appoint all).

<Table 11> Gubernatorial Power to Compose State Cabinet

Score	Category
5.0	Governor appoints all
4.0	Governor appoints all with state senate consent
3.0	Governor appoints some, others elected independently
2.0	Governor appoints some with state senate consent, others elected independently or no cabinet
1.0	All elected independently

Source: Dilger (1995)

Budget document deadlines: Dilger (1995) incorporated budget document deadlines into the index of gubernatorial enabling resources. He pointed out that in order to measure gubernatorial enabling resources accurately, it is required to account for the amount of time governors have to consider their decisions (Dilger, 1995). Since the creation of the executive

budget document is one of the governor's most important activities, the deadline for submitting the executive budget document can be used to measure the amount of time. A deadline that falls well into the state legislative session gives the governor more time to put together the budget and to work with state legislative leaders and others concerning its final form. Such a deadline also limits the time during which state legislative leaders and others could challenge the governor's budgetary decisions. Budget document deadlines can be measured as the length of time into legislative session before budget is due: from "no deadline" to "before start of session" as presented in Table 12.

〈Table 12〉 Submission Deadlines for the Budget Document

Score	Category
5.0	No deadline or one month
4.0	Less than one month
3.0	Two weeks
2.0	One week
1.0	Before start of session

Source: Dilger (1995)

Personal Powers

As every individual has his own set of personal attributes, governors have their own attitudes that can be turned into either strength (power) or weakness, depending on the situation. Based on Beyle's study (1996), this study examines five indicators of the personal strength of the governors including electoral mandate in the last election, position on the state's political ambition ladder as measured by any previous elective office experience, personal style, and gubernatorial performance rating

Electoral mandate: This indicator measures the margin of victory by

which the governor won the seat. The premise is that the larger the margin of victory, the stronger the governor will be in the view of other actors in the system (Beyle, 1995). Governors with a wide margin may use that margin as a political support by declaring that the people overwhelmingly wanted him or her in office so that a particular goal could be achieved. As in Table 13, this power can be measured on a five-point scale, ranging from those governors who won in a relative landslide on the high side to those who succeeded to office.

(Table 13) The Personal Power of Governors: Electoral Mandate

Score	Category
5.0	Landslide win
4.0	Comfortable majority
3.0	Narrow majority
2.0	Tight win or plurality win (<50%)
1.0	Succeeded to office

Source: Beyle (1996)

Position on the state's political ambition ladder: This indicator places the incumbent governors on the state's political ambition ladder in relation to their previous positions (Beyle, 1996). Beyle (1996) argues that a governor progressing steadily up from substate to statewide elective office to the governorship will be stronger than those who start at the top with the governorship as their first office.³⁾ As presented in Table 14, a five-point scale can be used to measure this indicator, running from those who moved upward in a steady progression from substate to statewide office to governor on the high side to those from governorship as their first elective office on the low side.

3) The advantages that former governors bring to the office are summed up like following: "he returned to office with a very focused agenda" and "is a competent, polished chief executive who understands the issues and how to make the system work."

<Table 14> The Personal Power of Governors: Position on the State's Political Ladder

Score	Category
5.0	Steady progression
4.0	Former governors
3.0	Legislative leaders or congress members
2.0	Substate position to governor
1.0	Governorship is first office

Source: Beyle (1996)

Personal style of governors: It is believed that the CEO's personality affects perceptions and attitudes of administrators and bureaucrats, thereby affecting their behavior and performance. The ability to charm and lead the voters, the media, and others can overcome deficits in other areas. A warm and enticing personality can obscure problems that might be quite deleterious to an administration. Conversely, those without these qualities often suffer because they cannot throw the blanket of their personal style and skills over problems (Beyle, 1996). The personal style of governors can be measured by perceptions of bureaucrats and the public about their governors on a scale ranging from charismatic to dull.

Personal future of governors as governors: It is believed that governors who just started their terms might and who have the ability to run again have more power than those who are almost ending their terms in office or are retiring. Governors who cannot run again become lame ducks with little political potential remaining. Beyle (1996) indicates that the personal future of governors can be measured on a five-point scale as shown in Table 15.

<Table 15> The Personal Future of Governors as Governor

Score	Category
5.0	Early in term, can run again
4.0	Late in term, can run again
3.0	Early in term, term-limited
2.0	Succeeded to office, can run
1.0	Late in final term

Source: Beyle (1996)

Gubernatorial performance rating: Performance will be another indicator of the personal power of governors. Gubernatorial performance ratings are the appraisals of governors' performance. There are several different methods to measure the performance of the governors (Beyle, 1996). Two of them involve asking the public directly just how well they think the governor of their state is performing. However, it is difficult to examine what constitutes a good performance by a governor. Indeed, developing a performance standard for governors is a very daunting task. People's perception of gubernatorial performance is based in part on the evaluation of whether the governor has achieved some level of success in economic development efforts and in part on how well the governors compared to their predecessors (Beyle, 1996). Their perception is also somewhat influenced by governors' ability to keep things on an even keel and to be in tune with what the voters want.

The second way to measure gubernatorial performance is by the state-level public opinion polls on how the citizens or registered voters feel their governor is performing (Beyle, 1996).

Integrating Three Gubernatorial Power Resources

Although previous studies have examined gubernatorial power resources and conducted empirical studies where the fifty governors are compared in terms of the exercise of powers, they failed to integrate the effects of gubernatorial personal, institutional, and enabling resources on the state administration and policy into a single study. Specifically, while Dilger (1995) attempts to synthesize the governors' power index linking institutional resources and enabling resources, he yet fails to incorporate governors' personal powers into his analysis. Similarly, Beyle (1998, 1996, 1995) tried to construct the index by linking institutional powers and personal powers. However, Beyle's power index neglects governors' enabling resources such as budget documents

deadline and gubernatorial staff support, revealing a critical weakness. While each of these studies no doubt contributes uniquely to identifying and defining gubernatorial powers, they need to be put together in order to construct a more refined and comprehensive index of gubernatorial powers.

〈Table 16〉 Comparison of Gubernatorial Powers among the American States

State	Power Resources			State	Power Resources		
	Institutional (1998)	Enabling (1991)	Personal (1998)		Institutional (1998)	Enabling (1991)	Personal (1998)
Alabama	2.7	3	3.5	Montana	3.6	4	4.5
Alaska	3.8	4	2.8	Nebraska	3.7	4	3.0
Arizona	3.3	4	3.3	Nevada	3.0	3	3.8
Arkansas	2.8	3	3.3	New Hampshire	2.8	4	4.3
California	3.0	3	3.3	New Jersey	4.1	4	2.5
Colorado	3.7	3	3.8	New Mexico	3.5	4	2.8
Connecticut	3.7	4	3.5	New York	4.1	4	3.8
Delaware	3.3	4	4.0	North Carolina	2.7	4	4.3
Florida	3.1	3	3.0	North Dakota	3.8	3	3.8
Georgia	2.9	4	3.3	Ohio	4.1	3	3.8
Hawaii	4.1	3	3.0	Oklahoma	2.7	3	4.3
Idaho	3.7	3	3.0	Oregon	3.1	2	4.0
Illinois	3.3	4	4.0	Pennsylvania	4.1	4	3.5
Indiana	3.2	2	4.5	Rhode Island	2.8	4	2.8
Iowa	3.8	2	4.0	South Carolina	2.8	2	3.3
Kansas	3.7	4	4.8	South Dakota	3.8	4	4.0
Kentucky	3.5	4	4.0	Tennessee	3.6	3	3.8
Louisiana	3.1	3	3.8	Texas	3.3	3	3.5
Maine	3.4	4	3.0	Utah	4.0	3	4.0
Maryland	4.1	4	2.8	Vermont	2.9	5	4.8
Massachusetts	3.0	4	3.3	Virginia	3.3	3	4.5
Michigan	3.6	3	4.3	Washington	2.9	3	4.0
Minnesota	3.6	4	3.8	West Virginia	3.8	4	4.0
Mississippi	2.8	3	2.8	Wisconsin	3.7	3	4.3
Missouri	3.5	3	4.3	Wyoming	3.6	4	4.3

Note: 5=very strong; 4=strong; 3=moderate; 2=weak; 1=very weak.

Sources: Compiled from data contained in Dilger's study on enabling powers (1991) and in Beyle's study on institutional and personal power resources (1998)

In a comprehensive manner, as an alternative, this study attempted to integrate the three power resources, institutional powers, enabling powers, and personal powers, into a single power index, thereby constructing and refining

the index of governors' powers. Indeed, the comprehensive index suggested in this study may provide a more accurate and viable indicator of the powers and resources available to governors.

Table 16 presents a comparison among the fifty gubernatorial powers based on the comprehensive power index suggested in this study. Specifically, it integrated gubernatorial institutional resources and personal resources identified in Beyle's (1998) study and enabling power resources in Dilger's study (1991) into a single index in an effort to construct a comprehensive power index. To compare the fifty governors in terms of their institutional, personal, enabling powers, the scores of the indicators in each power resource were totaled for each governor and then the total score was divided by the number of indicators, resulting in the mean score of the indicators for each resource.

It should be noted that since the three power resources were not compared in the same year, Table 16 presents only a rough relationship among the scores on the three power resources. It strongly, more importantly however, indicates that three different resources of gubernatorial powers can be integrated and measured in a comprehensive index.

Although not compared in the same year, the table shows that American governors enjoy varied levels of powers. While some governors exercise relatively strong institutional powers, enabling resources, and personal powers together, others suffer from relatively weak powers. For instance, it appears that governors of Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wyoming enjoy relatively strong powers in terms of all the three resources. In contrast, the governors of Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and South Carolina have relatively weak power resources.

More importantly, it should be emphasized that no governor has the highest score on all three power resources, suggesting that relatively weak institutional powers can be overcome by strengthening personal and enabling resources and vice versa. In addition, this table indicates that it may be possible to assess the changes of the governors' powers over time, allowing the

examination of whether each power resource of a governor increases (or decreases) over time.

Implications: Measuring Governors' Powers in Korea?

Governors are the most influential figure in the Korean provinces. Undoubtedly, however, some Korean governors may make better use of the three sets of powers than do others. For instance, a governor in an institutionally weak province may overcome such weakness through political savvy, charisma, coalition building, and other informal processes. Meanwhile, governors in institutionally strong provinces can easily waste the strength of their office through their political and administrative incompetence.

More importantly, whether to strengthen the powers of chief executives in the local governments including governors and mayors in comparison with the legislature has become an important issue in the age of local autonomy in Korea. Until a refined power index is constructed, however, researchers and political actors will quite likely continue to disagree about the relative influence of governors in their provinces and about whether governors' powers need to be strengthened in the Korean provinces.

In this regard, the index of gubernatorial power resources examined in this study helps provide researchers and others interested in the provincial government with a frame of reference for measuring governors' powers available in each Korean province. As a practical matter, researchers and administrators might be able to use a slightly modified version of the gubernatorial power index to compare Korean governors' institutional, personal, and enabling resources and further to track what changes have been made in governors' powers in a province over time.

Despite such important contributions and implications, there remain many important issues to be addressed. First of all, although important resources of the governors' powers were identified with the operationalization of their

corresponding measures and the comprehensive power index was constructed in this study, such efforts were made largely for the American governors not for the Korean governors, thereby requesting future research that contributes to our understanding of gubernatorial powers in Korea.

As a practical matter, in applying the power index constructed in this study to Korean governors, much care should be taken. It should be emphasized that the gubernatorial power resources considered in this study were never exclusive. Therefore, in order to examine governors' powers accurately and to devise a valid power index in Korea, it is clear that not only some important additional power resources should be included in the power index but some irrelevant measures should be excluded from the index. For instance, the power of appointment may not be applied and measured in the Korean situation, since Korean governors are under much constraint compared to American governors in terms of the appointive power.

In addition to the limitations mentioned above, two other important issues should be noted. First, it is difficult to assign appropriate weights to the three power resources when comparing the governors. One can argue that institutional resource is more important than personal and enabling resources, but not others. Second, it should be remembered that the index discussed in this study measures potential power for use by the governors, not the actual exercises of that power.

In a nutshell, further research should be focused on devising a valid and reliable power index that can be used in the Korean context and further assessing the actual impact of gubernatorial personal, institutional, and enabling resources on provincial politics and administration. In Korea, therefore, future research should focus on testing and revising the index of gubernatorial power resources through empirical investigations. Further, the power index for mayors should be also structured in order to increase the applicability of the power index to Korea in the presence of increasing severe conflicts among local governments rather than provincial governments.

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THE KOREA LOCAL ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

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Abstract

◎ Decentralization and Local Governance

Dh, Jae-Yiel

The Roh Moo-hyun administration, right after its inauguration in 2003, firmly initiated decentralization policies. This reform drive is expected to bring a sea change of power relations among various governments, in particular, between the central and the local governments. In addition, uncertain and dynamic environmental metamorphoses in South Korea demand different structures and management styles of local governments. As for the effective operation of the local society, the earlier management system centered on the local government clearly is limited. In its place, local governance is required, in that the new concept takes into consideration the cooperative network among constituents or agents of the local society. This study intends to investigate the decentralization policy of the Roh administration under way and the introduction of local governance as the corresponding response of the local society.

□ **Keyword:** decentralization, local governance, government,
regional innovation

◎ Prioritization of Local Government Policy Agendas for Successful Local Governance: Application of the AHP method

Choi, Young-Chool

This article theoretically discusses the who, what, why and how questions of local governance and empirically analyses policy tasks confronting the local government for successful local governance by applying the AHP method. The concept of local governance has been interpreted mainly in terms of the need for horizontal integration among stakeholders involved in the delivery of local public services. Local governance, on its own, is inadequate without the necessary changes in partnership-building. Based on these theoretical discussions, this article attempts to prioritize policy issues underlying the success of local governance. This paper concludes by indicating the importance of environmental factors affecting the success of partnership-building in making local governance practicable.

□ Keyword: local governance, partnership, AHP

◎ Conditions to Empower the Local Council: From a 'Principal-Agent' Perspective

Lee, Sang-Pal

Since the institution of local governments in 1991, local councils have contributed greatly to the development of local politics. Yet, residents think that local councils still do not meet their needs due to

their inactivation resulting from strategic behavior: political sabotage, corruption and moral hazard. This article aims to investigate major conditions, which will help break the vicious circle of local councils' inactivation. These conditions are divided into two phases. First, there are the preselection control conditions, which will lower entry barriers to the local council: abolishment of political party nominations; expanded public management of elections; payment of salaries to local council members; and a mechanism to screen inadequate candidates for public office. The second phase conditions are postselection control conditions, which will reinforce the expertise and improve the task skills of local council members: auditing skills, performance evaluation techniques, special political training, legislative research service, and personnel and institutional autonomy of the local council secretariat from the local government.

□ **Keyword:** local assembly, local assembly members, local election, party nomination, public management of election, payment of salary to local assembly members, local assembly secretariat

© Analysis on the Perception of Members of the Local Community Center Committee and Some Suggestions for Its Improvement

Cho, Seok-Joo

According to the policy of transforming *Eup-Myeon-Dong* functions, the local community center was established at the *Eup-Myeon-Dong* level in 1988 and since then, many have reported the advantages of these local community centers. After conducting a questionnaire survey on the perception of members of the Gunpo

Municipal Community Center Committee involved in the local community center's activities, this paper tries to assess the policy and make suggestions for further developments. Based on this assessment, the present paper suggests the following: first, transforming the facilities and programs of the local community center; second, improving the operation of the local community center; third, improving the selection and appointment of local community center committee members; fourth, intensifying the educational training in relation to the functions of the local community center; finally, enhancing the participation and representation of citizens in the local community center committee.

□ **Keyword:** local community center, local community center committee, local autonomy, citizen participation, community

◎ Alternative Schemes on the Transfer of Functions and Financial Resources in Introducing the Municipal Police in Korea

Kim, Surk-Tae

Introducing the municipal police in the local government is one way to devolve national responsibilities to local governments. Yet, the reallocation of financial resources should accompany the devolution of national functions to local governments. This paper intends to pursue the merits and demerits of alternative schemes to fund the institution of local government police.

There are three principal ways to reallocate financial resources: full matching grant, partial non-matching grant, and the transfer of

national taxes. A full matching grant is good for showing the direct relationship between devolution and resource reallocation. However this goes against the principle of local autonomy for the local governments continue to depend upon the central government for financial support. A partial non-matching grant is good for leveling the financial resources between local governments, but rich local governments may oppose this scheme because they have to take on new responsibilities without any additional transfer of financial resources. Transferring national taxes is the best way for both devolution and financial reallocation. Nevertheless poor local governments may not collect enough taxes for the newly increased services. A big trade-off may be inevitable in the choice among these three alternatives. However, in the short term a full matching grant may be more feasible while transferring national taxes may be more favorable to local autonomy in the long run.

□ **Keyword:** local police, grant, devolution

© Determinants of Interregional Migration in the Seoul Metropolitan Area: Focusing on Local Public Services

Kim, Bo-Hyun & Choi, Hwa-Sick

According to Tiebout's hypothesis, the process of expressing residents' preferences for publicly provided goods and services is referred to as 'voting with one's feet.' To the extent that interregional differences in the levels of public goods and services are not capitalized into property values, there is an incentive to migrate to the region with the greatest welfare benefits. The purpose of this study is to apply the Tiebout hypothesis (voting with one's feet) empirically to the Seoul metropolitan area. Based on the 1999-2000 data

of the Seoul metropolitan area, this study finds that the migrants (consumer-voters) exhibited a preference for higher welfare benefit areas. This finding lends support to the Tiebout hypothesis of 'voting with one's feet.'

□ **Keyword:** interregional migration, local public service (local public goods)

◎ Strengthening Local Governments' Urban Planning Responsibilities

Son, Sang-Rag & Lee, Si-Hwa

The Roh Moo-hyun administration is making efforts to promote local autonomy and as part of its efforts to accelerate the process of decentralization, the central government decided to let local governments determine their own city planning on June 25, 2003. In spite of such positive changes, the power of local governments in urban planning has not been fully established. Furthermore, preventing the central government from intervening in the process of urban planning may cause other problems. This paper examines the background and logic of strengthening the local autonomy in the area of urban planning. It also reviews the changes of related systems and controversial points. Based on this critical review, this study will suggest some alternatives to strengthen the power of the local government in the field of city planning.

□ **Keyword:** local decentralization, local autonomy, urban planning

◎ Governors' Powers: Conceptual Issues and Measurement

Shim, Jun-Seop

This study investigated the powers the governors have in the American states and attempted to develop a comprehensive index of gubernatorial powers that may enlighten how much influence and clout the chief executives have. For this, this study addressed the following questions. First of all, what factors constitute governors' powers? What variables constrain governors' powers? Second, how can we construct a comprehensive index of gubernatorial powers? What indicators provide a general profile of governors' powers? Third, to what extent do powers vary across the American states? Finally, what are the major implications for the Korean context? To answer these questions, this study focused on three separate sets of variables associated with gubernatorial power resources: institutional powers, personal powers, and enabling powers. Integrating the three power resources, this study suggested a more refined index of gubernatorial powers and drew its important implications for governors' powers in Korea.

□ Keyword: governor, power, index, resources